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Abstract
We present a model where the employees of a ﬁrm have to search for proﬁtable
business projects in a changing environment. Employees who have found a successful
project in the past period are shown to be reluctant to search for new and better
projects leading to corporate inertia. This reduces the ﬁrm’s proﬁts in the present
period. Still, inertia can in some situations increase overall proﬁts, because it raises
the employees’ initial incentive to ﬁnd successful projects. Reorganization and gradu-
ally reducing control over the employees’ search eﬀorts are means to overcome inertia.
However, optimal policies are not always time-consistent. This leads to too much re-
organization and to too little control reduction when the ﬁrm has no commitment
power.
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Business history is full of examples of successful ﬁrms that faced with a new challenge were
unable to change and lost their market leadership. To mention but two examples: At the
end of the sixties Firestone was one of the leading tire producers in the US. As Michelin
introduced the superior radial tire, Firestone was too slow to leave bias tires behind and fell
into deep ﬁnancial trouble before ﬁnally being bought by Japanese Bridgestone (see Sull,
1999). Laura Ashley had initially great success with its romantic garb, but experienced
declining demand as more women joined the workforce. Also Laura Ashley waited too
long to adjust its business concept and entered a decade of red ﬁgures on the bottom line.
Researchers conﬁrm the importance of entrants for innovation. Scherer (1980) writes that
"... new entrants contribute a disproportionately high share of all really revolutionary new
industrial products and processes. [p. 438]" Tushman and Anderson (1986), Ghemawat
(1991), and Christensen (1997) argue that incumbents are able to exploit incremental
improvements but often miss opportunities outside their core businesses.
Reinganum (1983) points out that the high R&D activity by entrants may be explained
by proﬁt maximizing behavior of the ﬁrms. Incumbents have smaller marginal beneﬁts from
innovating than entrants since doing so cannibalizes existing proﬁts. As a consequence,
incumbents invest less in R&D than entrants and are thus less likely to innovate. Gilbert
and Newbery (1982) claim, however, that incumbents may actually ﬁnd it optimal to
overinvest in R&D in order to preempt entry.
Whereas the economics literature on the persistence of leadership is primarily concerned
with the incentives to invest in R&D created by the market situation, the management
literature looks at how success or failure changes the behavior inside the ﬁrm taking the
incentives created by the market as given. This literature attributes inertia frequently to
insuﬃcient information processing of organizations and the subsequent failure to pursue
new courses of action. A prominent argument presented here revolves around the idea that
individuals do not maximize utility but are content with a satisfying level of achievement
(Simon, 1957, p. 204-205, and Simon, 1959). As long as a satisfactory level of performance
is reached, no search for new alternatives of action is undertaken. The levels of aspiration
are not chosen to maximize utility, but are determined by what is deemed practically
attainable at the time. The change of an organi z a t i o ni st h e nm a i n l ya na d a p t i v ep r o c e s s
rather than one in which improvements are constantly and actively pursued (Cyert and
1March, 1963). It is also argued that even if search occurs, bounded rationality of employees
leads, among other things, ﬁrms to improve matters only locally (for example, Nelson and
Winter, 1982, and Levinthal and March, 1993). Firms then make small adjustments to
current projects rather than undertake major new ones. As a consequence, ﬁrms often fail
to react optimally to changes in their environments.
Henderson (1993) attempts to disentangle the components of R&D investment and
organizational eﬀects on innovation for a branch of the photolitographic industry. She
ﬁnds that organizational eﬀects play a signiﬁcant role in explaining innovativeness by
documenting that incumbents’ R&D is less productive than entrants’, at least if the new
products involve a signiﬁcantly innovative design.
In this paper, we present a theory of inertia based on ineﬃcient actions within or-
ganizations. Whereas the above organizational arguments for explaining inertia rely on
boundedly rational behavior on the side of the employees, our approach builds on standard
agency theory and does not make use of any behavioral assumptions. The model is phrased
in terms of a ﬁrm operating in a market, but the general idea applies to any organization
that needs to reinvent itself from time to time due to pressure from, for example, competi-
tors, interest groups, or politicians. We consider a setup where a ﬁrm hires an employee
f o rt w op e r i o d st ol o o kf o ra n dt oi m p l e m e n tap r o ﬁtable business project. The employee
receives a private beneﬁt from running a business project, so in the ﬁrst period she invests
eﬀort in ﬁnding a good one. If the employee is unlucky in the ﬁrst period and ﬁnds no good
project, she will search for one again in the second period. We show that the situation
is diﬀerent when the employee ﬁnds a proﬁtable project. Then, the outcome depends on
how volatile the environment is. If the environment is stable and the project found in
period 1 is likely to be proﬁtable also in period 2, the employee does not search in period
2. Instead, she hopes that the ﬁrst period project is worth implementing again. Success
breeds in this situation inertia: even if a superior project exists, this will not be known
to members of the organization. If the environment is suﬃciently volatile, the employee
always searches in the second period and there is no inertia.
Inertia is costly. We show that it is important to distinguish between the ex-ante and
the ex-post cost of inertia. Once the ﬁrm and the employee are in the second period
(ex-post), the ﬁrm will ﬁnd that the employee tends to invest too little in information
acquisition. This means there are circumstances in which the employee does not search
2even if the ﬁrm would prefer her to. The problem of inertia is less severe from an ex-ante
perspective. The reason is that when the employee foresees that she can use a good project
in both periods, she will search more extensively in period 1. As a consequence, inertia
increases under some circumstances overall proﬁts even if it reduces second period proﬁts.
In other words, inertia may be optimal.1
In the second part of the paper we turn to the question of how and when to avoid inertia.
We ﬁrst consider policies that put pressure on employees to innovate. Speciﬁcally, we
explicitly analyze reorganization as a means of overcoming inertia. In a reorganization the
employees’ tasks are restructured in the second period. This forces all employees, including
those who were successful in the ﬁrst period, to look for a proﬁtable project in their new
area of responsibility. Microsoft, for example, reorganizes the corporation every second year
to change outmoded structures and to challenge ’comfortable people’ as Bill Gates puts it
(Executive Excellence, Dec. 2000). We show that the ﬁrm can beneﬁt from reorganizing
in the second period. Still, if the ﬁrm cannot credibly promise to not reorganize, it risks
changing the organization too often. This dilutes the employees’ incentive to ﬁnd a good
project in the ﬁrst period and may reduce proﬁts.
A reorganization is not the only way to ﬁght inertia. We show in a second application
that a stepwise decrease in restrictions for the employee may increase search and reduce
inertia. The idea is the following: The employee is in the ﬁrst period only allowed to look
for projects that ﬁtw e l li n t ot h eﬁrm’s business strategy. These are projects that have
ah i g hp a y o ﬀ to the ﬁrm but may not be the employee’s most preferred projects. The
employee is, if successful in the ﬁrst period, allowed to search in a wider class of projects,
reﬂecting what we call reduced control. She can therefore look for the projects in the
second period that ﬁt her interests best. This could, for example, be projects that allow
her to learn a new technology or to signal her ability to other ﬁrms. A reduction in control
can overcome inertia, because the employee is tempted by the possibility of implementing
a favored project. Thus, she searches for a new project in situations where she otherwise
would not have. Reduced control in the second period solves the problem of inertia by
rewarding the employee in the second period rather than ’sticking’ her, so she searches
harder in both the ﬁrst and second period (unlike in the case with a reorganization). The
cost of not keeping the employee on a short leash is that she searches for projects that
1The tension between ex-ante and ex-post eﬃciency in the provision of incentives arises in many diﬀerent
economic situations, see, e.g., Cremer (1995) and Schmidt (1996).
3are close to her interests, but not necessarily to those of the ﬁrm. We determine the
circumstances under which the ﬁrm beneﬁts from reducing the control over the employee’s
actions and show that a ﬁrm with no commitment technology available tends to keep too
much control.
We are not the ﬁrst to study formally how the pressure from the market aﬀects the
incentives inside the ﬁrm. Holmström (1982) and Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983) show that
the performance of competitors provide information that can be used when contracting
with a manager. Hart (1983) and Schmidt (1997) study how the degree of competition in
the market aﬀects the optimal managerial contract. These papers consider static setups
and do not address the issue of inertia, which is dynamic in nature.
There are a few recent papers that develop complementary theories of inertia in organi-
zations. Carrillo and Gromb (2002) study how diverse an organization should be in terms
of the characteristics of the employees. They show that homogenous ﬁrms are less likely
to undertake a radical change in their culture. This makes homogenous ﬁrms less ﬂexible,
but encourages at the same time culture speciﬁc investments. Insofar as the leading ﬁrms
in the market are the ones with a homogenous culture, well-adjusted to current market
conditions, this would be a competing explanation of why successful ﬁrms fail to change.
Schaefer (1998) explains inertia as the result of inﬂuence costs. There are rents up for
grabs when an organization changes, so employees get involved in rent-seeking behavior.
This leads to inertia by increasing the cost of change. The paper perhaps closest to ours
is Szalay (2001), which we discuss in more detail after presenting the model.
To facilitate comparability with the literature, we adopt a setup whose structure dis-
plays similarities with Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) model on authority in organizations. One
of the diﬀerences between the approaches is that the model presented here is — although
being simpler in each individual period — dynamic.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model and discusses it.
Section 3 presents the analysis of corporate reorganizations to reduce inertia and section
4 studies the eﬀects of reducing control. Section 5 discusses our contractual assumptions
and section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
42 A Model of Organizational Inertia
In each of two periods, t =1 ,2,aﬁrm can pursue one of inﬁnitely many ex-ante identical
projects of one period duration, F = {1,2,...}. The projects we have in mind are not lim-
ited to new products but also includes improvements of the production process, marketing,
or distribution. In each period only one of the projects is of positive value. This project
is denoted by x∗
t. All other projects have non-positive values both for the ﬁrm and the
employee.
An employee is hired to acquire information in order to identify x∗
t and to implement
the project, if a project is pursued. It is assumed that the employee is hired for two periods.
The employee’s information acquisition yields a signal about x∗
t, ˜ xt. The signal is correct
with probability qt and incorrect with probability 1−qt. If the signal is incorrect, each of
the projects with non-positive values are signalled with equal probability. Since there are
inﬁnitely many projects, this means that each of these projects is signalled with probability
zero. Information acquisition is costly for the employee. Her private cost depends on the
expected quality of the signal and is given by 1
2γq2
t.
After the project is selected, the employee observes whether the project is of positive
value or not. The employee has no interest in pursuing a project with non-positive value,
and reveals the value of the project truthfully. If the project with a positive value is
selected, it is fully implemented. In contrast, a project with non-positive value is scaled
down to a minimum (a switch to a diﬀerent project is impossible at this stage, however). If
the project is scaled down to the minimum, the payoﬀso fb o t ht h eﬁrm and the employee
are assumed to be zero.
The employee is integral to any full project implementation. Therefore, she obtains b
as a control rent and/or an informational rent. For example, this could be the employee’s
compensation if it is costly to replace her at this point, because of an informational lock-in.
Alternatively, it could be that the employee runs the project in a way that is best for her
career rather than what is in the best interest of the ﬁrm’s owners. The value to the ﬁrm
of a fully implemented project is B. We treat the above parameters b and B as exogenous
and identical in each period. This assumption is relaxed in Appendix B that considers a
complete contracts setup. Section 5 contains a summary of the analysis in Appendix B.
The project that has positive value in period 1 may not be a positive value project
in period 2. The optimal projects in the two periods are not identical with probability
5α ∈ [0,1]. α thus characterizes the volatility of the ﬁrm’s environment. We can think
of it as a change in the consumers’ taste or the technology frontier that requires a major
redirection of the ﬁrm’s activities. We will refer to α as the ’volatility’ of the ﬁrm’s
environment or the ’external pressure’ for a ﬁrm that has implemented a proﬁtable project.
We assume that all players are risk neutral and impose the following parametric re-
striction on γ to exclude any corner solutions:





2.1 The Second Period
At the beginning of the second period, there are two possible states of nature, j:t h eﬁrst
period project was a success (s), i.e. x∗
1 was implemented, or the selected project was a
failure (f). Please note that x∗
2 d o e sn o th a v et ob ei d e n t i c a li nt h et w oc a s e s ,g i v e nt h e r e
are valuable assets in place. If, for example, x∗
1 were the identiﬁcation and adoption of
a new production technology and was implemented in period 1, x∗
2 could be the further
improvement of that technology to stay ahead of the competition. If this technology was
not found in period 1, it could be that detecting and adopting it is the optimal project in
period 2.
We denote the employee’s optimal search intensity in the second period by q
j
2,w h e r e
j ∈ {s,f} indicates the ﬁrst period outcome.
Suppose that the ﬁrst period project was a failure, so the employee does not know x∗
1.











2 = b/γ.( 1 )
Using q
f
2 = b/γ, we obtain the expected utility of the employee in period 2 in case of
a ﬁrst period failure, E(u2 | f), and the expected ﬁrm proﬁts in this case, E(π2 | f):
E(u2 | f)=b2/2γ and E(π2 | f)=bB/γ.( 2 )
Consider now the problem of an employee who was successful in the ﬁrst period and
knows x∗
1. The employee receives a signal e x2. This signal indicates the optimal project in
the second period with probability q2.I fe x2 = x∗
1, the employee knows that x∗
1 is optimal
also in the second period.2 The problem facing the employee is more diﬃcult if e x2 6= x∗
1,
2If e x2 6= x∗
1, the probability of receiving the signal x∗
1 is zero as there is an inﬁnite number of non-
positive value projects which are all equally likely to be signalled. Therefore, we have that Pr(e x2 =
x∗
2|e x2 = x∗
1)=1 .
6as she has two conﬂicting signals. Here, we have the conditional expectations:
Pr(e x2 = x∗
2|e x2 6= x∗
1)=
αq2




2|e x2 6= x∗
1)=
(1 − α)(1 − q2)
α +( 1− α)(1 − q2)
.
Therefore, the employee follows the new signal iﬀ
Pr(e x2 = x∗
2|e x2 6= x∗
1) ≥ Pr(x∗
1 = x∗
2|e x2 6= x∗
1) ⇔ q2 ≥ 1 − α.
C h o o s i n gap r e c i s i o nl o w e rt h a n1−α has thus no value, as the signal is ignored whenever it
is diﬀerent from x∗










s.t. q2 ≥ 1 − α
I ft h ee m p l o y e ec h o o s e sq2 =0 , the project x∗
1 is implemented. Then, the expected
period 2 utility is E(u2)=( 1− α)b.I f s h e c h o o s e s q2 ≥ 1 − α, e x2 is implemented.
Comparing these two possibilities, we obtain:





0 for α<1 − b/2γ
b
γ otherwise (3)
As mentioned above, α can be understood as the external pressure to search for a
new project. An employee who experienced success in the ﬁrst period does not invest in
acquiring new information if the external pressure is not large enough.3 We will in this
situation say that the organization experiences inertia. Several authors have noticed that
it may be rational not to search in a stable environment when there are costs of collecting
and processing information. Stigler and Becker (1977), for example, write: ’In order to
make a decision one requires information, and the information must be analyzed. The
costs of searching for information and of applying the information to a new situation are
such that habit is often a more eﬃcient way to deal with moderate or temporary changes
in the environment than would be a full, apparently utility-maximizing decision’.4 Let us
deﬁne the critical level of α by α2 ≡ 1 − b/2γ.
3This is consistent with the belief of many management consultants that change requires a suﬃcient
sense of urgency among employees (see, for example, Kotter, 1996, p. 4).
4Miravete and Palacios-Huerta (2003) contains a discussion of literature on ’rational inertia’.
7For an unsuccessful employee the external pressure is never lower than for a successful
employee, since the current project’s probability of being successful in the second period is
zero. An employee who was not successful in the ﬁrst period always invests in information
acquisition.
In case of a success in period 1 it follows from (3) for the expected utility of the employee
and ﬁrm’s proﬁts in the second period:
E(u2 | s)=
½
(1 − α)b if α<α2
b2/2γ otherwise and E(π2 | s)=
½
(1 − α)B if α<α2
Bb/γ otherwise .
(4)
The above analysis shows that the employee either searches with the intensity b/γ or
not at all. The following proposition shows that the level of external pressure needed to
make a successful employee search again is too high from the point of view of the ﬁrm’s
second period proﬁts. The reason is that the employee carries the full cost of ﬁnding a
better project but only captures a part of the beneﬁts.
Proposition 1 Given that the employee either searches with the intensity b/γ or not at
all, the second period proﬁts of the ﬁr ma r em a x i m i z e dw h e nt h ee m p l o y e es e a r c h e sf o ra l l
α such that
α>1 − b/γ ≡ α2. (5)
Note that α2 < α2.H e n c e ,f o rα ∈ (α2,α2) a successful employee does not search even if
it would increase the ﬁrm’s second period proﬁts.
Proof. Whenever the employee searches, she chooses the intensity b/γ. Hence, the
expected proﬁts are bB/γ if the employee searches, and (1−α)B if she does not. Comparing
the two proﬁts yields the proposition.
Proposition 1 is the bad news in this story for successful ﬁrms: successful employees
do not always rest on their laurels, but the level of external pressure necessary to motivate
them to look for ways to reinvent the business is too high from point of view of the ﬁrm’s
second period proﬁts. This provides a simple, agency based explanation for the notion that
success fosters inertia. It is consistent with the empirical evidence cited in the introduction
as long as the direction of incremental progress is known and work on it can be monitored
more easily while more signiﬁcant innovation requires a search process as described in the
model.
82.2 The First Period


























1 >b / γfor α<α2, equation (6) makes apparent that inertia in the second period
is not only bad news: an employee foreseeing that a successful project can be reemployed
in the next period has a stronger incentive to ﬁnd the right project in the ﬁrst period. We
show in the next section that inertia might in some situations be optimal for the ﬁrm, even
if it reduces second period proﬁts, because it increases the employee’s incentive to acquire
information in the ﬁrst period.




1(B +( 1− α)B)+( 1− q∗
1)bB/γ if α<α2
2bB/γ otherwise. .( 7 )
Figure 1 illustrates the total and the second period proﬁts as a function of α.T h e
second period proﬁt is drawn assuming that the employee found and implemented x∗
1 in
the ﬁrst period. There is a discrete ’jump’ up in proﬁts at α2, where the external pressure
becomes so high that a successful employee starts to search in the second period. The
ﬁgure shows how α2 is deﬁned as the value of α such that the second period proﬁts are
the same when a successful employee searches and when she does not. α2 is always strictly
smaller than α2.
3 Overcoming Inertia I: Adding Internal Pressure
Since successful ﬁrms may display excess inertia if external pressure for the employees is
insuﬃcient, it seems natural for the ﬁrm to complement it with pressure from within the
ﬁrm. In the following we analyze reorganization as one policy measure to achieve this.
Afterwards we discuss two more policies that increase overall pressure on the employees.
One way of adding pressure on the employees — and hence of overcoming inertia — is
to reorganize the ﬁrm in the second period and restructure the employees’ tasks. This
9Figure 1: The total expected ex-ante proﬁts (solid) and the expected second period proﬁts
given that the employee was successful in the ﬁrst period (dotted) as a function of α.
(B =1 , b =1 /2,a n dγ =2 ).
can, for example, be done through a new organizational structure in which also individual
responsibilities and goals change. A change in responsibilities adds internal pressure to
the pressure from the environment as it forces the employees to ﬁnd a way to accomplish
their new tasks eﬃciently. To do this they have to invest in acquiring information in the
second period. Thus, a reorganization forces successful employees to search in situations
where they otherwise would not have.5
In our simple framework, a reorganization can be represented as an activity by the ﬁrm
that renders the probability that a successful project in the ﬁrst period can be reemployed
in the second period zero. That is, for the employees it is as if α =1 .6 We assume that a
reorganization does not introduce any costs or beneﬁts except those arising endogenously
due to knowledge being destroyed and created.
First notice that a corporate reorganization does not aﬀect an employee who was unsuc-
cessful in the ﬁrst period. She will search with the intensity b/γ in all tasks, so the payoﬀ to
the ﬁrm and the employee are the same whether tasks are restructured or not. Therefore,
5A reorganization creates higher incentives for information acquisition than simply rotating jobs. In
an environment of job rotation it is possible for the employees to retrieve the information about the
previous course of action, for example, from internal documents or conversations with the former
incumbent of the position. Any search eﬀort would then potentially be misdirected towards past
actions rather than new ones.
6One can also interpret a restructuring as an event that erases the ﬁrm’s memory of past actions, which
forces it to ’reinvent’ itself.
10the ﬁrm will embark on a reorganization if and only if it wants successful employees to
search again.
Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h eﬁrm cannot commit to not reorganizing production in the second
period. Then, it will reorganize, if doing so increases second period proﬁts. The analysis
in the previous section shows that a reorganization will occur for all α ∈ (α2,α2).
Suppose instead that the ﬁrm has a commitment technology available. A commitment
to not reorganize the production decreases second period proﬁts for α ∈ (α2,α2).O nt h e
other hand, it increases at the same time the intensity of search in the ﬁrst period. The
next lemma deﬁnes the region of α for which the ﬁr mw o u l dw a n tt oc o m m i tt ok e e p i n g
the same organization for two periods.






2γ(1 − α)b − b2
















Then, the ﬁrm will commit not to reorganizing the production in the second period for all
α ≤ α.
Proof. The ﬁrst term on the left hand side (LHS) of (8) is the proﬁts of the ﬁrm when
t h ee m p l o y e ed o e sn o ts e a r c hi nt h es e c o n dp e r i o d ,a n dt h es e c o n dt e r mi st h ep r o ﬁts when




γ = α2 it reduces to −Bb2
2γ2 < 0. The proof follows from continuity of the LHS of
(8).
Figure 1 illustrates α that is deﬁned as the α such that the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent ex-ante
whether a successful employee searches in the second period or not. Therefore, α takes
both the eﬀect on second and ﬁrst period search into account. We are now ready to state
the main result of this section.
Proposition 2 (Excess Corporate Restructuring)Aﬁrm that has a commitment
technology available will reorganize the ﬁrm in the second period for α>α .Aﬁrm with
no commitment technology will reorganize the ﬁrm for α>α 2. Without commitment, the
possibility of reorganization strictly reduces proﬁts for α ∈ (α2,α), because the employee
invests less in information acquisition in the ﬁrst period.
Proposition 2 illustrates the time-consistency problem that the ﬁrm may face. The ﬁrm
will reorganize the production in the second period for all α>α 2. However, ex-ante the
11ﬁrm would prefer only to reorganize for α>αin order to not dilute period 1 incentives.
Without a way to commit itself, the ﬁrm may end up in a situation where there is too much
reorganization. That is, inertia is fought excessively and reduces total expected proﬁts.
This occurs for α ∈ (α2,α) in equilibrium. In the other regions of the parameter space the
decision whether to reorganize will be optimal both from an ex-ante and an ex-post point
of view.
Alternative policies that add internal pressure: Discussion
Regular reorganizations is one example of how ﬁrms can ﬁght inertia by increasing internal
pressure. In the following we discuss two alternatives to restructuring that also impose
internal pressure on the employee.
One measure of avoiding repetition of the same project is simply excluding the status
quo. The ﬁrm asks the employee to propose a project diﬀerent from the currently imple-
mented one, x∗
1.7 Szalay (2001) develops an elegant model of delegation along these lines.
He considers a situation where an advisor has to recommend which action to take. Szalay
shows that it is optimal to exclude advice close to the prior belief about the right action.
This has a cost when the optimal action is close to the prior, but in Szalay’s framework it
induces the advisor to search harder, because the mistakes she can make become larger.8
Translated into our framework this means that if the prior belief is based on previous
search a) for a successful employee α is artiﬁcially rendered 1 in period 2 a n db )e v e ni ft h e
signal obtained in period 2 is the status quo it cannot be chosen. We show in this paper
that in a dynamic context there is an additional cost that needs to be taken into account:
excluding advice around the prior reduces the advisor’s incentive to search for the best
possible advice in the periods before, because accumulated knowledge is usable for fewer
periods.
Another alternative is to require a certain percentage of sales to stem from recent
innovations. For example, 3M requires that 30% of sales have to come from products
introduced within the last four years (see von Hippel, Thomke and Sonnack (1999)). This
gives employees a strong incentive to innovate as established product lines might be scaled
down or closed. This policy increases α and is essentially a milder form of the application
7Notice that the informational requirements to implement this strategy is higher than for a reorgani-
zation, because the management of the ﬁrm needs to know x∗
1.
8Since advice close to the prior can be optimal ex-post, it requires the possibility to commit to such a
policy.
12discussed above. Again, this way of ﬁghting inertia has its costs. First, the bias towards
new products is costly when the existing products have the most promising prospects.
Second, it reduces the employees’ incentives to ﬁnd good products in the ﬁrst place. Any
organizational measure that increases α suﬀers from the problem of reducing ex-ante incen-
tives. Thus, the measure will be applied ineﬃciently often, if intertemporal commitment
is impossible.
4 Overcoming Inertia II: Limiting Control
Applying additional pressure on the employee is one way to reduce inertial tendencies
within the organization. After a success, where the employee would prefer to rest on
her laurels, she is forced to invest in information acquisition again. In the absence of
intertemporal commitment, however, the negative eﬀect on the employee’s initial eﬀort
causes this policy to be imperfect. In the following we analyze a policy that rewards
success rather than penalizes it. As one would expect, such a policy does not suﬀer from
the drawback of stiﬂing initial eﬀort; to the contrary, it facilitates initial eﬀort exertion. We
uphold for now the assumption of payoﬀ non-veriﬁability and focus on the consequences of
organizational policies for employee behavior. Speciﬁc a l l y ,w es t u d yt h ee ﬀect of a stepwise
increase in the employee’s liberties (or reduced of control over the employee). By this we
mean that in the second period the employee has the opportunity to search in an expanded
set of projects.
If the additional projects are more attractive to the employee than the initial set, the
possibility to search in an expanded set of projects increases the employee’s incentive to
look for a new project, because she can channel her search towards the new set of projects.
Expanding the project set may then increase proﬁts even if the added projects are less
proﬁtable than the projects in the original set. To formalize this notion, consider the
following variation of the model. In addition to the initial set of projects F there is a
second group of alternatives that the agent can search in, E. There exists a proﬁtable
project in each of the two sets of projects in each period. The optimal projects in E and
F in period t are denoted x∗
t,E and x∗
t,F, respectively, t ∈ {1,2}. Again, x∗
1,i 6= x∗
2,i with
probability α, i ∈ {E,F}.T h e t w o s e t s d i ﬀer in their payoﬀs to the employee and the
ﬁrm. When x∗
t,F is found and implemented, it pays B to the ﬁrm and b to the employee
whereas x∗
t,E pays b b t ot h ee m p l o y e ea n d b B to the ﬁrm (b b>band B>b B). Thus, F
13contains a project that is very proﬁtable for the ﬁrm but provides only modest utility for
the employee; in E it is the other way around. We can think of F as the projects that
ﬁtw e l li n t ot h eﬁrm’s business strategy whereas E are projects that allow the agent to
learn a new technology, to signal her ability to the outside world, to pursue a project in
which she has intrinsic interest in or to enjoy other perks.9 In addition, we assume that
the overall surplus of the proﬁtable project in the new set is lower than in the original
one, b B + b b<B+ b. To simplify notation we will, however, be more speciﬁc regarding
parameters and assume that b b = B and b B = φb,w h e r eφ<1.
We assume that the principal can ensure that the agent searches only in F.10 The CEO
can, for example, attend preliminary meetings and make sure that the proposed products
can be sold using existing distribution channels or be produced in existing plants. An
employee who searches in F with the intensity qt in period t will ﬁnd x∗
t,F with probability
qt. On the other hand, there are ways to (credibly) give up control and allow the employee
to search in both E and F. The CEO may oversee many projects and be too busy to
interfere, or the employee may be given the formal authority to make decisions in her
business area. An employee who is allowed to search in both E and F focuses on E
and thus ﬁnds x∗
t,E with probability qt. The set of assumption implies that allowing the
employee to search in both sets is suboptimal for the ﬁrm in a one-period setting.
We compare two organizational forms: one where the ﬁrm keeps control in both periods
and restricts the employee to search in F, which we call control, and another where the
employee is allowed to search in both E and F after a success in the ﬁrst period.11 We term
the latter case limited or reduced control. The analysis in section 2 corresponds to the
case of control. In the following we thus analyze the case of reduced control. The results
obtained when the ﬁrm follows an limited control policy are indicated with a diamond
superscript. Afterwards, we compare the two organizational policies.
9Before 3M established the rule that a certain percentage of sales had to come from recent innovations
its R&D eﬀorts were characterized by signiﬁcant liberties for researchers. As one manager noted:
"There is clearly less freedom in the labs than there was 10 of 15 years ago, and it means that it’s
less fun for researchers. As a result, there are more motivation and morale issues to deal with today."
See Bartlett and Mohammed (1995).
10Our the setup is therefore diﬀerent from, for example, Aghion and Tirole (1997) where the employee
and the ﬁrm search in E and F, respectively.
11There are, of course, other possibilities such as allowing to employee to search in E and F in both
periods or only after a failure in the ﬁrst period. It can be shown that these other possibilities are
never optimal.
144.1 Limiting Control and Inertia: The Second Period
As before we proceed backwards and start with the analysis of period 2.
Suppose ﬁrst that the employee was unsuccessful in the ﬁrst period. Then, she has to
search again in F and chooses the intensity b/γ. Suppose instead that the employee was
successful in the ﬁrst period and is allowed to search in both project sets. The expected
utility if the employee searches is B2/2γ. If she chooses not to search, she has to implement










0 if α<1 − B
2
2bγ ≡ b α2
B/γ otherwise
.( 9 )
If we compare how much the employee invests in information acquisition in the second
period under control and reduced control, we obtain:
Remark 1 There is less inertia and a higher intensity of search in period 2 if success is
rewarded with a reduction in control.
Allowing the employee to search in both E and F in the second period gives her a greater
incentive to acquire information, since she has the possibility to ﬁnd a project yielding a
higher utility than the one found in the ﬁrst period. On the one hand, this increases the
intensity with which the employee searches, B/γ instead of b/γ. On the other hand, it
also implies a larger region of α for which she undertakes search, α ∈ [1 − B2
2bγ,1] instead
of α ∈ [1 − b
2γ,1].
While reducing control increases search activity, it is directed towards a less proﬁtable
set of projects in period 2. In order to compare the policies of control and limited control
we have to include also diﬀerences in search activity in period 1.
4.2 Limiting Control and Inertia: The First Period
The employee’s search decision in period 1 under limited control takes her optimal period
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For α<b α2 the employee’s actions are identical under control and limited control. α is
too small to induce a successful employee to search in period 2 even under limited control.
This also implies that search in period 1 is unaltered if the ﬁrm reduces control over the
employee in the second period. As a consequence, proﬁts are the same under control and
limited control in this parameter range (see (7) and (11)).
To exclude this less interesting area of the parameter space we make the following
assumption:
A.2. α ≥ b α2.
Comparing equations (6) and (10) makes it evident that:
Remark 2 Under A.2. there is a higher intensity of search in period 1 when success is
rewarded with a reduction of control.
Since success is rewarded with more freedom under reduced control, initial search in-
centives increase. In contrast to period 2, these are not directed towards projects with a
lower proﬁtability, but to the original project set F and, thus, constitute an additional
beneﬁt of reducing control for the ﬁrm.
Albeit Remarks 1 and 2 taken together document that reducing control leads to more
search in both periods, this does not imply that reducing control is the optimal policy.
Under reduced control the employee chooses to channel her search towards less proﬁtable
projects in period 2. This negative eﬀect of limiting control has to be weighed against
higher search activities in both periods.
164.3 The Optimal Level of Control
Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h eﬁrm has no commitment technology available. Then, the ﬁrm reduces
control over the employee’s search only if it increases second period proﬁts.
Lemma 3 Suppose that φ ≥ 1/2. Then, reducing control maximizes second period proﬁts
in the following regions of the parameter space:
i) for all α ∈ [b α2,α2) if B2/2b2 ≤ φ and
ii) for α ∈ [1 − φb/γ,α2) if B2/2b2 >φ .
If φ<1/2, reducing control is not proﬁtable in the second period.
Proof: See Appendix.
In our setup, it reduces the second period proﬁts to let the employee search in E and
F if she would search also in F only. In particular, the proﬁts are Bb/γ under control but
only φBb/γ under reduced control. Hence, without commitment the ﬁrm does not reduce
control over the employee’s search for α>α2, since there is no problem of inertia. Reduced
control may potentially increase proﬁts in period 2 for α ∈ [b α2,α2) where there is no search
under control but search under reduced control. Whether limited control indeed maximizes
period 2 proﬁts depends also on the level of proﬁts possible under this policy, parametrized
by φ. For very low potential proﬁts φ<1/2, control leads to higher period 2 proﬁts for
all α. Reduced control yields higher proﬁts in period 2 for the entire range of potential
α if φ is large, φ ≥ B2/2b2.12 For φ between these two extreme ranges, reduced control
maximizes period 2 proﬁts for part of the potential range of α, b α2 < 1 − φb/γ ≤ α<α2.
A ﬁrm without the possibility to commit to a certain policy ex-ante will choose be-
tween them governed by the result described in Lemma 3. To compare the ﬁrm’s choice
under non-commitment to the ex-ante most proﬁtable one (the strategy that is selected
if commitment is possible), we compute the optimal policy from an ex-ante perspective.
This is done by comparing E(π) and E(π♦), the expected ex-ante proﬁts under control
and reduced control, respectively. These are given by (7) and (11).
12This requires that B ≤ 2b,s i n c eφ ≤ 1.
17Lemma 4 Compare the ex-ante proﬁts under control and reduced control. There are three
regions where reduced control maximizes ex-ante proﬁts:
i) For B2/2b2 >φ≥ 1 − B2γ/b(2bγ + B2 − b2) deﬁne α(φ) as the unique solution to
the equation E(π♦)=E(π). α(φ) belongs to [b α2,α2) and is strictly decreasing in φ.
Then, reduced control maximizes ex-ante proﬁts for α ∈ [α(φ),α2).
ii) For B2/2b2 ≤ φ reduced control maximizes ex-ante proﬁts for all α ∈ [b α2,α2).
iii) Reduced control maximizes ex-ante proﬁts for α ∈ (α2,1] iﬀ. φ ≥ 1 − (B2 −
b2)γ/b(2bγ + B2 − b2).
In all other regions of the parameter space control maximizes ex-ante proﬁts.
Proof: See Appendix.
The analysis requires more case discriminations, since it includes the intertemporal
eﬀects of the two policies. Again, the optimal outcome depends crucially on the potential
proﬁti np e r i o d2 under reduced control, measured by φ.
We are now in a position to state the main result of this section:
Proposition 3 (Excess Control)Aﬁrm that has no commitment technology available
will limit control over the employee’s search in the second period for α ∈ [min{b α2,1 −
φb/γ},α2) to avoid inertia. A ﬁrm with a commitment technology will reduce control for
a strictly larger set of the parameter space than without commitment.
Proof: See Appendix.
Given the analysis in the previous section it is not surprising that reducing control is
a policy that is applied too seldom. Reducing control in the second period increases the
investment in information acquisition in the ﬁrst period, and it may thus increase total ex-
ante proﬁts even if it reduces second period proﬁts. This positive eﬀect is not exploited if
the ﬁrm cannot commit ex-ante to a policy of reducing control over a successful employee.
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium outcome with and without commitment. Region
I-III in the ﬁgure correspond to region i.−iii. in Lemma 4, respectively. Reduced control is
the outcome in region II when the ﬁrm does not have access to a commitment technology.
Here, reducing control solves the problem of inertia that arises if the ﬁrm keeps control
in the second period. Furthermore, φ is suﬃciently high that reduced control does not
diminish the proﬁtability of a new second period project by too much. In regions I and III
18Figure 2: The organizational choice of the ﬁrm. Without commitment, the ﬁrm chooses
limited control in region II of the parameter space and control everywhere else. With
commitment, the ﬁrm chooses limited control in regions I, II, and III. (b =3 /4, B =1 ,
γ =2 .)
it is optimal to reduce control over a successful employee even if doing so decreases second
period proﬁts. The reason is that reduced control serves as a carrot in the ﬁrst period,
and induces the employee to search more extensively. In regions I and III the ﬁrm thus
faces a time-consistency problem, and reduced control is the equilibrium outcome only if
the ﬁrm has a commitment technology available. Outside the regions I-III the ﬁrm always
keeps control. φ is here so low that the loss of proﬁts in the second period outweighs the
beneﬁts from a greater investment in information acquisition.
As long as the external pressure is not suﬃciently high, employees in successful ﬁrms
have to be continually motivated from within the organization to search for new opportu-
nities. This analysis documents that rewarding employees with increased liberties can be
a sensible policy if the environment is not too stable even when no intertemporal commit-
ment is possible. The absence of commitment, however, induces this policy to be applied
too seldom, since positive ex-ante eﬀects on search eﬀort will not be factored into the
decision. Notice that the employee’s freedom to pursue her favorite projects is not a cause
of success as in, e.g., Aghion and Tirole (1997). Rather, it is a consequence of success and
serves to maintain the company’s success.
19Limiting control if the overall surplus increases: Discussion
We have in this section chosen to focus on the case φ<1. Under these circumstances,
the ﬁrm would never reduce control if the employee was hired for only one period. What
if one-period proﬁts increase rather than decrease if the employee is allowed to search in
both sets of projects? Then, the question is whether it is not always best to provide the
employee with the freedom of search in both periods. This is, however, not the case, since
the ﬁrm may want to keep control to induce the employee to search harder in the ﬁrst
period and/or to ﬁght inertia in the second period.
We can capture the situation of an increasing overall surplus by assuming that 1 <
φ<B / b . Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h eﬁrm has no commitment technology. Then, it will always
allow the employee to search in E and F in the second period, as it increases second
period proﬁts. This eliminates the possibility of reducing control as a reward, so it has
no eﬀect on the ﬁrst period search. Reduced control may still be used to avoid inertia
in the second period. To see this, suppose that the employee were allowed to search in
both sets already in period 1 and found a successful project (in E) .T h ee m p l o y e ew o u l d
only search in the second period for α ≥ 1 − B/2γ. On the other hand, she would search
again for α ≥ 1 − B2/2bγ were the project in F, so limiting control reduces the external
pressure necessary to induce search. When the ﬁrm can commit to not relaxing control
over unsuccessful employees, reducing control can be used in certain circumstances even
more proﬁtably. Then, rewarding success only, which increases the initial investment in
information acquisition.
5C o m p l e t e C o n t r a c t s
Contracts were up to now incomplete in the sense that even if both the employee and
the ﬁrm could observe the outcome of the search, it was not possible to contract on this
information. This is — in our opinion — often a quite realistic assumption. It is much harder
to measure objectively the output of creative eﬀort than subjectively. One way around the
measurement problem is to contract on proﬁts. However, the proﬁts that accrue from an
idea will typically depend on the eﬀort and talent of the whole organization, and might be
a poor measure of the value of the initial idea. This said, it is nevertheless important to
explore to what extent our results are driven by the contractual assumptions made.
In appendix B we analyze the model assuming that the parties can contract directly
20on the outcome of the search. A successful employee receives as before a non-monetary
beneﬁto fb>0,b u tt h eﬁrm can now pay a bonus on top of this. It is assumed that
the employee is cash-constrained in both periods.13 We consider both the case where the
ﬁrm can commit to its second period actions and where it cannot. The reﬁnement that
a two-period bonus scheme should be renegotiation proof is imposed. The aim of the
analysis is to ﬁnd out under which conditions organizational measures will be used to ﬁght
inertia when it is possible to contract on the outcome of the search. It turns out that
the necessary conditions for reorganization and reduction in control to be used are very
similar. Therefore, we only consider reorganization in the appendix, but details concerning
reduction in control are available upon request.
We show that it makes an important diﬀerence whether the ﬁrm can commit to a
two-period bonus scheme. Without commitment, there exists a region of α for which a
reorganization following success increases second period proﬁts. Furthermore, as long as
the non-monetary beneﬁti sas u ﬃciently important part of a project’s payoﬀ (B<2b),
we ﬁnd as in Proposition 2 that the ﬁrm tends to reorganize too often in the second period
from point of view of ex-ante proﬁts.
The ﬁrm has much better possibilities to solve the moral hazard problem when it can
commit to a two-period bonus scheme. Success in the ﬁrst period can either be rewarded
by paying a bonus right away or by promising a better bonus in the second period. We
show that if it is optimal to avoid inertia, the ﬁrm pushes the reward for success forward
to the second period. The employee is then only paid a low bonus in the ﬁrst period but
is made residual claimant in the second. This leads to the search that maximizes overall
surplus in the second period and solves the problem of inertia. There is thus no role for
second-best measures such as reorganization or reduction in control.14
To summarize: the results of the main model do not change qualitatively if it is possible
to contract on the outcome of the search as long as a) the employee is cash-constrained, b)
the ﬁrm cannot commit to a two-period bonus scheme, and c) the non-monetary beneﬁt
of a successful project is suﬃciently important.
13Without an initial cash-constraint it is trivial to implement the ﬁrst best: the ﬁrm simply oﬀers a bonus
of B, which makes the employee the residual claimant, and extracts all surplus with an initial negative
wage. As residual claimant, the employee searches in such a way that total surplus is maximized.
14A caveat is in place here: the two-period contract described is not always feasible, as it may require
an e g a t i v eﬁrst period wage. In the appendix we state the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the
contract to be feasible. When the non-negativity constraint on the ﬁrst period wage binds, there may
again be a role for reorganization or reduction in control.
216C o n c l u s i o n
We present in this paper a theory of inertia in organizations. It builds on the simple,
intuitive idea that employees who were successful in the past are reluctant to search for
new and better ways of doing business, because they carry the full cost of the search but
only get a part of the beneﬁt.
We show that the volatility of the environment, or the external pressure, plays a crucial
role. Inertia arises only when the external pressure is not too high, so yesterday’s success
is likely to be successful again today. Inertia may reduce the proﬁts of a ﬁrm that was
successful in the past, but even then it is not necessarily bad news for overall proﬁts. An
employee invests more in ﬁnding a good project when there is inertia, because it can be
employed in more than one period. Therefore, inertia increases total proﬁts as long as the
environment is stable. However, if the environment is relatively volatile, but not enough
to stop a successful employee from resting on her laurels, inertia reduces total proﬁts.
In the second part of the paper it is discussed how and when to avoid inertia. In the ﬁrst
application we consider the possibility of a corporate reorganization where the employees
are assigned new tasks in the second period. It is shown that the ﬁrm can beneﬁtf r o m
a reorganization, but without commitment it risks reorganizing too many times. As an
alternative way of ﬁghting inertia, we analyze reducing control. Here, if the employees are
successful, they are allowed to search for new opportunities in an extended and, for the
employees, more favorable set of alternatives in the second period. On the upside, this
policy alleviates the problem of inertia. Furthermore, since reducing control works like a
carrot rather than a stick, the employees also search more extensively initially. On the
downside, the projects found are less valuable to the ﬁrm. We show that reducing control is
optimal if the diﬀerence between the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm’s and the employees’ preferred
projects is not too large. It is also shown that, absent a commitment technology, the ﬁrm
tends to keep control too often and to reduce control over the employee too seldom.
Our results imply that organizational policies are dynamic in nature. Successful ﬁrms
require more changes than unsuccessful ones from a pure organizational standpoint (in-
creasing internal pressure or increasing freedom) even though these measures may be sub-
optimal from a one-period perspective. As a ﬁrm becomes unsuccessful it reverts to the
optimum organizational structure for near-term search. Assumed that this structure is
known to the ﬁrm it stays in place until success arrives.
22The basic framework developed in this paper is very simple and has potentially a num-
ber of applications. It could, for instance, be very interesting to embed it more explicitly
into a market and study industry dynamics. We leave this and other possible extensions
for future work.
23AA p p e n d i x
Proof of Lemma 3
We ﬁrst consider α ≥ ¯ α2 such that a successful employee searches both under limited
control and control. The expected second period proﬁts are Bb/γ under control and φBb/γ
under limited control. Since φ<1,t h eﬁrm always chooses control in the second period.
Consider thus α ∈ [b α2, ¯ α2). The proﬁts are B(1 − α) under control and φBb/γ under
limited control. Hence, limited control maximizes second period proﬁts iﬀ α ≥ 1 − φb/γ.
The proof follows from computing the intersect of the set α ≥ 1−φb/γ with b α2 ≤ α ≤ ¯ α2.
¤
Proof of Lemma 4
Consider α ∈ [b α2, ¯ α2). E(π) is continuous and strictly decreasing in α whereas E(π♦)
is constant. Since E(π) |α=b α2≤ E(π♦) |α=b α2⇔ B2/2b2 ≤ φ,t h eﬁrst part of the proof
follows. The second and the third part follow from E(π) |α=¯ α2≤ E(π♦) |α=¯ α2⇔ φ ≥
1 − B2γ/b(2bγ + B2 − b2) and dα(φ)/dφ =( ∂E(π)/∂α)/(∂E(π♦)/∂φ) < 0. Finally, for
α ∈ [¯ α2,1] E(π) and E(π♦) are both independent of α, and proof follows from comparing
the two proﬁt functions. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
We need to show that there is limited control for a strictly larger set of the parameter space
with commitment than without. For α ∈ (¯ α2,1] this follows immediately from Lemmas 3
and 4. For α ∈ [min{b α2, ¯ α2}] and B2/2b2 ≤ φ there is limited control with and without
commitment. Finally, consider α ∈ [min{b α2, ¯ α2}] and B2/2b2 >φ . There is limited
control for α ∈ [max{b α2,α(φ)}, ¯ α2) with commitment and for α ∈ [max{b α2,1−φb/γ}, ¯ α2)
without commitment. Since E(π) |α=1−φb/γ<E (π♦) |α=1−φb/γ and E(π) is decreasing in
α, it follows that α(φ) < 1 − φb/γ. Hence, there is limited control for a larger set of the
parameter space with commitment than without. This proves the claim. ¤
24B Complete Contracts and Reorganization
In this appendix we analyze whether the ﬁrm would want to reorganize in the second
period to induce search if it were possible to contract directly upon the outcome of the
employee’s search. We start from the following additional assumptions:
• A successful project has a monetary and a non-monetary pay-oﬀ. The monetary
pay-oﬀ (B) accrues to the ﬁrm and the non-monetary (b) to the employee. It is
assumed that B>b .
• T h ee m p l o y e ei scash-constrained every period. A bonus payment in the ﬁrst period
is thus consumed within the period.
The ﬁrm oﬀe r st op a yab o n u st oas u c c e s s f u le m p l o y e et op r o v i d ei n c e n t i v e st os e a r c h .
A negative wage in case of failure would be optimal were the employee not cash-constrained.
Instead, the ﬁrm oﬀers a zero wage (the lowest possible wage) if the project is a failure.
In what follows, the wage will refer to the bonus in case of success.
We divide the analysis into two cases. First, we consider a situation where the ﬁrm has
no commitment power. The ﬁrm will thus oﬀer the bonus that maximizes proﬁts in the
subgame considered. It seems plausible that it is harder to commit to an organizational
form than to a bonus scheme. Consistent with this idea, we assume that if the ﬁrm
cannot commit to the second period bonus in the ﬁrst period, it can neither commit not to
reorganize. After having analyzed the case of no commitment, we determine the outcome
when two-period contracts are available.
The Optimal Contract without Commitment
The Second Period
Suppose that x∗
1 was not identiﬁed in the ﬁrst period. Then, the employee solves the


































25The expected second period proﬁts and utility of the ﬁrm and the employee, respec-
tively, are:
E(π2 | f)=( B + b)2/4γ,
E(U2 | f)=( B + b)2/8γ.
Suppose instead that x∗
1 was found. The ﬁrm has then to decide whether it wants
to induce search. We proceed in two steps. First, we solve the ﬁrm’s problem assuming
that it wants to induce search. After this, we compare proﬁts with and without inertia to
determine the optimal wage.











2γ(1 − α) − b if α ≤ 1 − (B + b)/4γ,
(B − b)/2 otherwise.
Another possibility is not to encourage search (subscript B)b ys e t t i n gws
2,B =0 .T h e
employee will still search if the environment is very volatile, α>1 − b/2γ, because she
gets b from a successful project.
The optimal wage can now easily be obtained by comparing the proﬁts of the two
programs.






0 if α ≤ 1 − (B +2 b)/4γ,
2γ(1 − α) − b if 1 − (B +2 b)/4γ<α≤ 1 − (B + b)/4γ,
(B − b)/2 otherwise.





(1 − α)B if α ≤ 1 − (B +2 b)/4γ,
(B + b − 2γ(1 − α))2(1 − α) if 1 − (B +2 b)/4γ<α≤ 1 − (B + b)/4γ,





(1 − α)b if α ≤ 1 − (B +2 b)/4γ,
2γ(1 − α)2 if 1 − (B +2 b)/4γ<α≤ 1 − (B + b)/4γ,
(B + b)2/8γ otherwise.
A reorganization increases proﬁts in the second period if E(π2 | f) >E (π2 | s), because
it deletes the memory of the organization. From comparing E(π2 | f) and E(π2 | s),w e
obtain:
26Lemma 6 The ﬁrm is reorganized in the second period for α ∈ (1 − (B + b)2/4γB,1 −
(B + b)/4γ).
The lemma shows that as long as there is a non-monetary beneﬁt (i.e. b>0), there
exists a region of α where reorganizing the ﬁrm increases second period proﬁts. Here, it
decreases the wage necessary to induce search by reducing the utility from not searching
to zero.
The ﬁrst period











q1 =( w1 + ∆E(U2)+b)/γ where ∆E(U2) ≡ E(U2 | s) − E(U2 | f).
The ﬁrm solves:
Maxw1 {q1(B + E(π2 | s) − w1)+( 1− q1)E(π2 | f)},
where q1 is deﬁned above. Solving the ﬁrm’s problem, we obtain:
w1 =( B − b + ∆E(π2) − ∆E(U2))/2 where ∆E(π2) ≡ E(π2 | s) − E(π2 | f).
Using w1, we have that the total expected proﬁts, E(π),a r e :
E(π)=
(B + b + ∆E(S2))2
4γ
+ E(π2 | f) where ∆E(S2)=∆E(π2)+∆E(U2).
Notice that if there is a reorganization in case of success ∆E(S2)=0 . This leads to
the following result:
Lemma 7 A reorganization maximizes overall proﬁts of the game if and only if it increases
total surplus in the second period.
This illustrates the commitment problem facing the ﬁrm: reorganizing increases ex-
ante proﬁts if and only if ∆E(S2) < 0. In the second period, however, the ﬁrm has an
incentive to reorganize if ∆E(π2) < 0.
27Lemma 8 A reorganization increases (strictly) ex-ante proﬁts in the non-empty set α ∈
(1 − 3(B + b)/8γ,1 − (B +2 b)/4γ).
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the region α ≤ 1 − (B +2 b)/4γ. Here, ∆E(S2) ≤ 0 iﬀ. α ≤
1 − 3(B + b)/8γ.N o t i c et h a tB>bimplies that 1 − 3(B + b)/8γ<1 − (B +2 b)/4γ.F o r
1 − (B +2 b)/4γ<α≤ 1 − (B + b)/4γ, ∆E(S2)=( B + b − γ(1 − α))2(1 − α) − 3(B +
b)2/8γ.W eh a v et h a t∂∆E(S2)/∂α = −2(B +b)+4γ(1−α) < 0 in the region considered.
Furthermore, since ∆E(S2)=0for α =1− (B + b)/4γ,w eh a v et h a t∆E(S2) > 0 for
α ∈ (1−(B+2b)/4γ,1−(B+b)/4γ). A reorganization would thus reduce proﬁts. Finally,
∆E(S2)=0for α ≥ 1 − (B + b)/4γ.
We are ready to determine whether there is too much or too little reorganization going
on when the ﬁrm has no commitment technology available.
Proposition 4 If the size of the monetary pay-oﬀ is less than twice the size of the non-
monetary pay-oﬀ (B<2b), there is strictly too much reorganization going on when the
ﬁrm has no commitment technology available. Otherwise, there is a region of α with too
little and a region with too much reorganization.
Proof. Follows from comparing the thresholds in Lemma 6 and 8.
The proposition shows that under the assumption of a) no commitment and b) cash-
constraints, the results of the model do not change qualitatively with the introduction of
complete contracts, at least if the non-monetary beneﬁti sas u ﬃciently important part of
the return on a project. Proposition 4 summarizes results from two separate regions. For
1−(B+2b)/4γ<α≤ 1−(B+b)/4γ, a successful employee is oﬀered a higher wage when
there is no reorganization in order to induce search. The higher wage decreases proﬁts,
but increases total surplus in the second period. Lemma 7 implies then that a ﬁrm with no
commitment power would reorganize in this region of the parameter space whereas a ﬁrm
with commitment power would not. For α<1 − (B +2 b)/4γ, it is too costly to induce
search without reorganizing. In this region the ﬁrm gets 2/3 of the total surplus in the
second period if it reorganizes. If it does not reorganize, it gets less (more) than 2/3 of the
surplus if B<2b (B>2b). Therefore, a ﬁrm with no commitment technology available
tends to reorganize too often (seldom) if B<2b (B>2b) to capture a larger share of the
surplus.
28The Optimal Contract with Commitment
The main diﬀerence compared to the previous analysis is that the ﬁrm can now commit
to a two-period bonus scheme. We will impos et h ec o n s t r a i n tt h a tt h ec o n t r a c to ﬀered is
renegotiation proof. The contract can thus not include a wage that is lower than the one
that maximizes second period proﬁts. If it did, the ﬁr mw o u l dh a v ea ni n c e n t i v et oo ﬀer
a higher wage in the second period, an oﬀer the employee would accept.15
We make the following assumption on the parameters of the model, which excludes
corner solutions where the ﬁrst period wage is zero:
• A.3. B − b ≥ 5(B + b)2/8γ
We ﬁrst ﬁnd the optimal contract when there is no inertia (subscript A)a n dw h e n
there is inertia (subscript B) ,a n dt h e nw ec o m p a r et h e m .
The Optimal Contract with No Inertia










2γ(1 − α) − b if α ≤ 1 − (B + b)2/4γ,
(B − b)/2 otherwise.
w
f
2,A ≥ (B − b)/2.
where q1,A =( w1,A + b + ∆E(U2,A))/γ and E(π2,A | i)=( B − wi
2,A)(wi
2,A + b)/γ, i =
F,S. The constraint on ws
2,A ensures that the employee searches and that the contract is
renegotiation proof in case of success. Similarly, the constraint on w
f
2,A takes care that the
contract is renegotiation proof if the ﬁrst period project is a failure. We have left out the
non-negativity constraint on w1,A, but comment on it later. Writing down the Lagrangian
of this problem, we have:
LA = q1,A(B − w1,A + E(π2,A | s)) + (1 − q1,A)E(π2,A | f) −
λ1Max{2γ(1 − α) − b − ws
2,A,(B − b)/2 − ws
2,A} − λ2((B − b)/2 − w
f
2,A).
15The ﬁrm and the employee will not renegotiate a wage higher than the one maximizing second period
proﬁts. A higher wage could increase total surplus, but it is not proﬁtable for the ﬁrm, because the cash-
constraint makes it impossible for the ﬁrm and the employee to share the additional surplus generated.
29After simplifying the expressions, the ﬁrst-order conditions can be written as:




















(B + b + ∆S2,A)/2γ + λ1
=0 .
where λi ≥ 0 with λi =0if the associated constraint does not bind. From these conditions,
a couple of results follow:




B for α ≥ 1 − (B + b)/2γ,
2γ(1 − α) − b otherwise.
The wage following a failure is equal to the one that maximizes the second period proﬁts,
w
f
2,A =( B − b)/2.
Proof. Consider ∂LA/∂ws
2,A =0and suppose that λ1 =0 .T h es o l u t i o nt o∂E(S2,A |
s)/∂ws
2,A =0is ws
2,A = B. ws
2,A follows then from the constraint: B ≥ Max{(B −
b)/2,2γ(1 − α) − b} ⇔ α ≥ 1 − (B + b)/2γ.C o n s i d e rn o w∂LA/∂w
f










(B +b+∆S2,A)/2γ>0 for w
f
2,A =( B −b)/2. Hence, λ2 > 0
and w
f
2,A =( B − b)/2.
The optimal contract with no inertia has the interesting feature that for α ≥ 1−(B +
b)/2γ a successful employee is made residual claimant in the second period. The ﬁrm
extracts thus no surplus in the second period. In the ﬁrst period, however, the ﬁrm can
oﬀer a low wage without destroying the employee’s incentives. This way of constructing
the contract allows the ﬁrm to get (partially) around the cash-constraint.
Let us ﬁnally comment on the non-negativity constraint on w1,A, which has been ig-
nored in the problem above. It can be checked that
w1,A =( B − b − 5(B + b)2/8γ)/2 for α ≥ 1 − (B + b)/2γ,
so A.3. implies that the non-negativity constraint is not binding in this region. However,
for α<1 − (B + b)/2γ it may be binding. It turns out that it is not necessary to solve
the program for α<1−(B +b)/2γ taking the constraint w1,A ≥ 0 into account explicitly.
30The reason is that for α<1 − (B + b)/2γ allowing inertia gives higher expected proﬁts
than inducing search. We need the following auxiliary result to show this:
Lemma 10 The proﬁts when search is induced are no greater for α<1−(B+b)/2γ than
for α ≥ 1 − (B + b)/2γ.
Proof. It can be shown that w
f
2,A =( B − b)/2 for all α.F o r α ≥ 1 − (B + b)/2γ
neither the constraint w1,A ≥ 0 nor ws
2,A ≥ Max{2γ(1 − α) − b,(B − b)/2} are binding.
For α<1−(B +b)/2γ, the latter constraint, and sometimes the former, is binding. Since
α does not enter the objective function, but only the constraints, the proof follows.
The Optimal Contract with Inertia
Suppose that a successful employee is not given incentives to search in the second period.




2,B {q1,B(B − w1,B + E(π2,B | s)) + (1 − q1,B)E(π2,B | f)}
subject to:






2,B ≥ (B − b)/2.




2,B + b)/γ,a n d
E(π2,B | s)=( 1− α)B. Writing down the Lagrangian, we have:
LB = q1,B(B − w1,B + E(π2,B | s)) + (1 − q1,B)E(π2,B | f) −
λ1(ws




After some manipulations, the ﬁrst-order conditions are:
w1,B =( B − b + ∆E(π2,B) − ∆E(U2,B))/2=0 ,
∂LB/∂ws













(B + b + ∆S2,B)/2γ + λ3 =0 ,
where λi ≥ 0 with λi =0if the associated constraint does not bind. It can be shown
as above that w
f
2,B =( B − b)/2.A n y ws
2,B ∈ [0,2γ(1 − α) − b] can be a solution to
31∂LB/∂ws
2,B =0 .16 Considering the non-negativity constraint w1,B ≥ 0,w eh a v et h a tf o r
ws
2,B =0 ,w h i c hr e l a x e st h i sc o n s t r a i n ta sm u c ha sp o s s i b l e ,w1,B =( ( 2−α)(B−b)−(B+
b)2/8γ)/2. Hence, wB
1 > 0 under A.3. for all α.
The Optimal Contract
We are now ready to determine the optimal contract with commitment. The ﬁrst step
is to show that the proﬁts of the two programs (inertia and no inertia) coincide for α =
1−(B+b)/2γ. Afterwards, we show that it is optimal to allow inertia for α<1−(B+b)/2γ
but not for α>1 − (B + b)/2γ.
Lemma 11 The proﬁts with and without inertia coincide for α =1− (B + b)/2γ.
Proof. If there is no inertia, the constraint on wS
2,A is (exactly) not binding for α =
1 − (B + b)/2γ and ws
2,A = B. Consider now the program with inertia. It follows from
∂LB/∂ws
2,B =0that any ws
2,B ∈ [0,B] can be part of the solution to the program.
Consider thus ws







2,B). Finally, wA = wB and α =1−(B +b)/2γ imply that the proﬁts
of the two programs are the same.
Lemma 12 The proﬁts with (without) inertia are higher than without (with) for α<(≥
)1 − (B + b)/2γ.




2,A) the solution to program i, i ∈ {A,B},
as a function of α.D e n o t ee wi ≡ w∗
i(1 − (B + b)/2γ), i = A,B.T h e o v e r a l l p r o ﬁts of
the game as a function of the vector of wages and α are denoted πi(wi,α),i= A,B.
Consider ﬁrst the program where search is induced. We have that e wA = w∗
A(α) for all
α ≥ 1−(B+b)/2γ. Using Lemma 10, it follows that πA(w∗
A(α),α) ≤ (=)πA(e wA,1−(B+
b)/2γ)) for α<(≥)1 − (B + b)/2γ. Consider now the program with inertia. w∗
B(α)=
((B − b + ∆E(π2,B) − ∆E(U2,B))/2,(B − b)/2,0) is a solution to this program whenever




= −(B + b)q1,B < 0.
Using Lemma 11, we have that πB(w∗
B(α),α) > (≤)πA(e wA,1 − (B + b)/2γ)) for α<(≥
)1 − (B + b)/2γ. The proof follows from comparing the proﬁts of the two programs.
16It follows that there is no solution to the program for α>1 − b/2γ.
32The next proposition summarizes the analysis up to now:
Proposition 5 The optimal renegotiation proof contract when the ﬁrm has a commitment
technology available is w1 =( B − b + ∆E(π2,B) − ∆E(U2,B))/2 and w
f
2 =( B − b)/2. For
α ≥ 1 − (B + b)/2γ a successful employee is induced to search again by setting ws
2 = B.
For α<1 − (B + b)/2γ there is inertia, and ws
2 =0is an optimal wage.
A couple of interesting results follow from this proposition.
Corollary 1 There is inertia precisely when it maximizes the joint surplus of the employee
and the ﬁrm.
Proof. With no inertia, the maximal joint surplus in the second period is (b + B)2/2γ,
which is obtained for ws
2 = B. With inertia the joint surplus is (1 − α)(B + b). Hence,
inertia is optimal if and only if α ≤ 1 − (B + b)/2γ.
Corollary 2 Under A.3. a ﬁrm with a commitment technology available will never reor-
ganize in the second period.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 9 that the constraint ws
2,A ≥ Max{(B−b)/2,2γ(1−α)−b}
only binds for α ≤ 1 − (B + b)/2γ. However, arguing as in the proof of Lemma 12 it can
be shown that inertia is optimal for α ≤ 1 − (B + b)/2γ even if the constraint on ws
2,A is
removed. It follows that a reorganization cannot increase proﬁts for any α.
A ﬁrm that can commit to a two-period bonus scheme has, as long as the non-negativity
constraint on the ﬁrst period wage does not bind, the possibility to solve the problem
of inertia. If it is optimal to induce search, the ﬁrm oﬀers a contract that makes the
employee the residual claimant in the second period. This leads to the search behavior
that maximizes overall surplus, a surplus that the ﬁrm extracts through a low ﬁrst period
wage. Since the optimal contract solves the problem of inertia, there is no role for second-
best measures such as a reorganization or reduction in control.
We have looked at the solution when A.3. does not hold. In this situation, it is not
optimal to make the employee residual claimant in the second period, because the ﬁrm
cannot extract enough rents in the ﬁrst period due to the cash-constraint. Hence, ws
2,A <B
for α ≥ 1 − (B + b)/2γ. Here, it is possible to construct examples where a reorganization
increases proﬁts.
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